An Independent Kurdistan – a Buffer Zone for Iran!

First Published: 2014-07-18  Middle East Online BasNews ekurd.net An Independent Kurdistan – a Buffer Zone for Iran! Iran could be making a strategic mistake for actively opposing the independence of Kurdistan Region!  With the ISIS onslaught on Iraq and Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk and other claimed disputed areas, the case for Kurdistan’s separation from Iraq and forming an independent State has grown exponentially to the displeasure of Iran. While Kurds have repeatedly reiterated their right to self-determination before, without attracting any major reaction from the neighbouring countries, this time Iran has reacted fiercely as the independence claim has followed by substantive action. Masoud Barzani, the President of Kurdistan Region, while speaking to CNN last month, stated ‘the time is here’ for self-determination. Few days later, the President went to the Kurdistan Parliament and directed its law makers to commence preparing the groundwork for the holding the referendum on independence. The Iranian government responded with fierce opposition stating that Iran will not allow disintegration of Iraq and formation of an independent Kurdistan on its Western borders. Hossein Amir Abdollahian, the Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs, went even further branding the idea of an independent Kurdistan as an Israeli project to redraw the region’s map. He said, "We will never allow Netanyahu's dreams for Iraq and our region which are aimed at disintegrating the important and sensitive region of West Asia to come true." But behind the media rhetoric, Tehran appears worried not so much about the disintegration of Iraq but the ramifications that may follow. Firstly, an independent Kurdistan could cause a domino effect on its restive Kurdish population to revolt against Tehran and join their brethren in the newly established State. An independent Kurdistan is thus seen as a recipe for Iran’s disintegration in the long run. Secondly, Tehran is also equally worried about the potential secular and democratic character of an independent Kurdish State at its doors posing an inherent threat to its Shiite theocratic political establishments. Whether or not Tehran’s such fears and concerns are realistic, the antagonism is producing concrete counter-productive economic, political and security consequences for Iran that could outweigh the above-mentioned speculative fears and concerns. In particular, the current ISIS sectarian fighting poses a significant security threat to Iran. Without Kurdistan Region’s cooperation in confronting this new threat, given its proximity and the geographical advantage in the area, Iran could face harmful consequences in the long run. Economic Implications: As the political friction increases, Tehran-Erbil bilateral economic relations face retraction rather than growth. Tehran has already fallen behind Turkey in making any significant economic inroads into the Kurdistan Region. In comparison to Iran, Turkey has become Kurdistan’s main economic and political partner. During the last decade, Turkey has taken significant steps to establish vital economic ties with the Kurdistan Region. Turkey has invested billions of dollars in the Region and concluded significant oil and gas contracts spanning for a period of 50 years. The newly built oil pipeline taking Kurdish crude oil to the world market through Turkey’s Ceyhan port is set to provide Turkey with significant economic benefits. Turkey enjoys even greater economic prospects, as the Region boosts its oil and gas developments. Iran on the contrary has not taken similar advantage of the boom in the Region. The volume of bilateral trade between the Kurdistan Region and Iran in 2013 was forecasted around 4 billion three times lesser than that of Turkey forecasted over $12 billion. A recent report indicated that Tehran and Erbil reached an initial agreement to build two pipelines to transport Kurdish crude oil and natural gas to Iran, but the new political frictions over Kurdish self-determination may even dissolve these promising economic projects. Further, Iran risks significant trade loss if Tehran undertakes its recent threat of closing its borders with the Kurdistan Region in case it proclaims independence. This will push the Region drift away further from Iran and rely more heavily on Turkey. This will cause a significant downturn to Iran’s exports industry as Iran lacks any other viable export gateway due to international sanctions. Political Implications: Alongside adverse economic consequences, Iran may also lose its political influence in the Region. Iran used to have closest political relations with all the major political parties of the Kurdistan Region. These relations go back to 1980s and 1990s when Iran provided significant support to the Kurdish parities in their struggle against the Saddam regime. After the Kurdish enclave was established in 1991, Iranian officials often participated in Region’s official ceremonies showing tacit recognition of the Region’s political status. Yet in the last 5 years, Tehran has lagged behind Turkey and has not invested further on these historical relations to establish coherent strategic ties with the Kurdistan Region. Five years back Turkey strongly opposed the political experiment of the Kurdistan Region. Yet Turkey made radical changes to its political approach by taking Kurdistan Region as strategic political, economic and security partner rather than threat. This could be seen as Turkey’s reflection on the changing political dynamic in the Middle East with Kurds being amongst the main actors, a dynamic Tehran refuses to accept or apprehend. Under the new approach, Turkey has not only gained significant economic benefit, but also increased its political influence in the Region through forging a relatively strong political alliance with the KRG in response to the region’s changes. Turkey has also managed to deal with its internal affairs courteously in the context of the current peace process undergoing with the PKK. The peace process has commenced to a large extent at the backdrop of the growing bilateral economic relations with the Kurdistan Region. A cease fire has effected with the PKK and South East of the country has stabilised, ending decades of state of military emergency and internal fighting that claimed over 40,000 lives. These growing Turkish-Kurdish relations with lack of similar political approach by Iran may come at the expense of further political gap between Iran and the Kurdistan Region. It is not in the interest of Iran to disregard an old but still valid strategic political equation of maintaining Kurdish support in the region that once formed the core of the Ottoman–Safavid rivalry in the region. Because of geopolitics and national traits of the Kurds both Ottomans and Safavids saw Kurdish support as an essential part of their strategy to shadow greater influence in the region. The division of Kurdistan for first time in 1514 after the Battle of Chalderan was in line with this strategy of obtaining Kurdish side even if divided. Yet as Kurdistan Region comes closer to Turkey and the peace process between Turkey and PKK consolidates, Iran’s influence in Kurdistan and even the region at large may start dwindling. Currently Iran does have some influence in the Kurdistan Region through its close relations with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the second ruling party in the Region; however, these relations are subject to Kurdistan Region’s growing political and economic ties with Turkey. Therefore, Iran cannot rely on these political relations with the PUK to have greater political and economic influence in the Region without radical overhaul of its approach to the Kurdistan Region. Security Implications Iran may also face counter-productive security implications. One of the implications is already apparent in Kurdistan Region’s overall reaction to the recent Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, or the Islamic State) takeover of the towns and cities in the north and central Iraq. ISIS is marching to Baghdad and further South close to the Iranian borders and mounting a significant sectarian security threat not only to Baghdad but also to Iran. Soon after the ISIS onslaught last month, Tehran and Baghdad sought Kurdistan Region’s assistance to fight back and expel the ISIS from Iraq. At the same time, both sides strongly opposed KRG’s recent undertakings towards economic self-sufficiency and greater political status. These included the steps taken in managing and selling energy resources, aspiration for self-determination and return of the disputed areas, including Kirkuk, to the Kurdistan Region. Iran’s bilateral strategic relations, therefore, favoured religious allies in Baghdad above the Kurdistan Region. Iran’s approach to the Kurdistan Region appears to be narrowly constructed on the notion of ‘threat’ rather than ‘mutual interests’. It disregards Kurdistan’s role in the region’s wider political and security dimension, including its cooperation against the current sectarian threat on its borders. As a consequence, Kurdistan Region has modified its political stance in the region and refused to confront ISIS, apart from Jalawla clashes solely aimed at pushing them out of the Kurdish region. On the contrary, Iran’s alliance with the Kurdistan Region based on mutual interests including support for independence and return of the Kurdish disputed areas stretching as far Mandali and Badra in the south to the KRG will be in Iran’s long term interest. It will not only result in close bilateral economic and political cooperation, it will also provide Iran with the security advantage of Kurdistan Region serving as a buffer zone between Iran and any sectarian threat from the West of its borders, including the current ISIS threat that has entangled the region. Looking Ahead: Tehran therefore requires a new approach towards Kurdistan Region based on ‘mutual interest’ rather than ‘threat’. The current antagonistic approach may push Kurdistan Region to lean further towards Turkey at the expense of adverse economic, political and security consequences for Iran. With the sectarian fight intensifying in Iraq, Iran may need Kurdistan Region’s cooperation to confront sectarian threat to its Western borders. Sooner rather than later, Iran’s support for an independent Kurdistan will provide Iran with a buffer zone against any threat to its Western borders.