The US policy and the Kurds of Rojava

Middle East Online World Affairs Journal eKurd Daily First published: 18-09-2015 Recent events have drawn international attentiontowards the Kurds, as they effectively confront the Islamic State (IS) both in Syria and Iraq. Their determination is linked to their hope for carving out a nation of their own. However, this also complicates the region even further as the Kurds have a stake, not just in Iraq and Syria, but also in Turkey and Iran; each having a sizable Kurdish population. As Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq and the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) in Syria, liberate regions they claim historically Kurdish,they increase the concerns of neighboring countries. Turkey clearly has reasons to be concerned. For nearly four decades, Turkey has been trying to quell Kurdistan Workers Party’s (PKK) armed movement that has claimed more than forty thousand lives. Despite early progress, the peace process initiated two years ago reached a dead end as the PKK failed to lay down its arms and theTurkish government failed to implement the expected cultural and political reforms.

In this precarious environment a Kurdish political entity consolidating on Turkey’s southern borders with Syria,led by the PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD),is of clear concern to Ankara. Turkish President Recap T. Erdogan openly statedthat Turkey will never allow a Kurdish State appearing on its southern borders.The Kurdish Forces, however, not only expanded their self-governing territories, but also gained US backing in their fight against IS.  The U.S. airlifted weapons to YPG forces during the siege of Kobani and continued their assistance with intensive airstrikes against IS positions on YPG battlefronts. While US relations with Kurdish groups in Syria have been limitedto military support against IS,  Turkey fears that this will grow into more formal relations and, ultimately, international recognition, similar to that of their brethren in the KRG. Despite these fears, Turkey refrained from any direct military intervention in Rojava. This might be linked partly to international warnings against such military intervention, and partly to the fact that Turkey did not anticipate sudden expansion of Kurdish-controlled territories. However, whenYPG pushed IS outof GreSpi (Tel Abyad)with the help ofthe U.S. airstrikes and moderate rebel group Burkan al-Furat, the situation changed. The YPG gains linked both Jazira and Kobani Cantons andboosted Kurdish confidence to advance into Jarablus and surrounding areas. This would then link all the three cantonsand seal the longest patent border between Turkey and Syria. These developments coincided with great changes in Turkish internal political dynamic following the last parliamentary election when the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to maintain its majority and President Erdogan’s failed to change the Turkish political system into a presidential one. The gains made by the Kurdish, PKK-supported, People’s Democratic Party (HDP) in the election was to blame for AKP’s loses. This has prompted the AKP to increasingly focus on regaining popularity within the Turkish nationalist constituencies in preparation for the forthcoming snap election. The Suruc suicide bombing that killed 32 civilians on 20th July andthe killing of two Turkish policemen in Sanliurfa(22nd July) by the PKK triggered Turkey into changing anti-IS and anti-PKK military policy. Turkey agreed to join the International Coalition against the IS and provide U.S. access to its Incirlik base. In return,the U.S. offered its blessing for Turkish incursion across its borders with both Syria and Iraq. They gave tacit approval to Turkish airstrikes against PKK strongholds in Iraqi Kurdistan, and create a possible“safe zone”in Northern Syria which is thought to beprimarily aimed atrestrainingthe YPG from linking the area between Jarablus and Kobani. Turkey claimed that the airstrike campaign against IS and PKK targets is the direct response the Suruc killings and PKK’s violation of the peace process, and it serves to facilitate humanitarian effort enabling the return of Syrian refugees. However, these justifications have been questioned because the bulk of military airstrikes so far have been against PKK targets and surrounding villages, but only rarely against IS targets. Furthermore, Turkey’s ability to create a safe haven for returning refugees is severely doubted. While the US could be playing a balancing act between the Kurds and the Turks, Turkey stand helpless in weakening or undermining the Kurdish control over Rojava. The US- Kurdish relations in Syria is more likely to strengthen as YPG forces have proved to be the most effective boots on the ground to fight IS in Syria. Other Western powers have also hesitated in supporting the Turkish fight against PKK, as was evident from the recent NATO meeting which was held at the request of Turkey and failed to yield any commitment from NATO to assist Turkey fighting PKK. Instead, NATO askedTurkey to “show restraint”. The European Union also voiced concern and stressed the need for “proportionality” in the Turkish fight against PKK. The Kurds are currently playing an important geopolitical and security role in the region, therefore, it is incomprehensible to consider that the U.S. and West would completely turn their back on them anytime in thenear future.Importantly, Turkey’s over simplistic approachand possible full-scale war against both the PKK in Turkey and Iraq, and against YPG in Syria will further complicate the regional military dynamics, much to the benefit of the common enemy, IS. Hiwa Zandi is a political analyst specialising in Middle East and Kurdish political affairs. He is also a lawyer currently based in Australia and studying Master of Laws from the University of Queensland. You can follow him on Twittor @Hiwa_Zandi.